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Abstract
The best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions concern-
ing children. This cornerstone of international children’s rights has been codified in 
Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In EU family 
reunification law, the best interests of the child are mentioned in Directive 2003/86/EC 
on the right to family reunification. However, in the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, this concept is not systematically applied in the various types of 
family reunification cases. In this contribution it is argued that, although the contexts 
of family reunification cases may be different, from the perspective of the diverse inter-
national obligations of the Member States, it would be preferable if the Court systemati-
cally involved the best interests of the child concept in all family reunification cases.
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1 Introduction
In every measure affecting children, the best interests of the child should be 
a primary consideration. This principle, which is laid down in Article 3(1) 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), is one of the principles of 
interpretation of international children’s rights.1 In EU law it has been codi-
fied in Article 24(2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter). Within European family reunification law, the best interests of the 
child concept is often invoked2 and is referred to in both legislation and case 
law.3 Most notably it was mentioned in the MA ruling of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU), in which the transfer of unaccompanied minor 
asylum seekers was deemed incompatible with the best interests of the child.4 
Therefore the Member State in which an application for asylum of an unac-
companied minor was submitted, is responsible for handling the asylum ap-
plication.5 In family reunification law, the use of the best interests concept by 
the CJEU in interpreting the different instruments of EU family reunification 
law is less coherent.6 Even though Article 5(5) Directive 2003/86/EC (‘Family 
Reunification Directive’)7 states that Member States should have due regard 
for the best interests of the child, the principle is not referred to in every ruling 
1   Bueren, G. van, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1998), p. 45.
2   See, for an analysis of the role of the best interests concept in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights on Article 8 ECHR, Smyth, C., ‘The Best Interests of the Child in 
the Expulsion and First-entry Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: How 
Principled is the Court’s Use of the Principle?’, 17(1) European Journal of Migration and Law 
(2015) 70–103.
3   See for an analysis of the role of the best interests concept in EU asylum law, Smyth, C., 
European Asylum Law and the Rights of the Child, Research in Asylum, Migration and Refugee 
Law (London and New York, Routledge 2014). For an analysis of the role of the best interests 
concept in EU family unification law, see Klaassen, M., The right to family unification: between 
migration control and human rights (Leiden, E.M. Meijers Institute and Graduate School of 
Leiden Law School, 2015), Chapter 4.
4   CJEU, MA, BT, DA, C-648/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:367. See, for further analysis, Arnold, S., M. 
Goeman & K. Fournier, ‘The Role of the Guardian in Determining the Best Interest of 
the Separated Child Seeking Asylum in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Systems of 
Guardianship in Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands’, 16(4) European Journal of Migration 
and Law (2014) 480.
5   In its proposal to amend the Dublin III Regulation, the European Commission seeks to over-
turn this with the objective of preventing secondary movements. See COM(2016)270 final.
6   Klaassen, 2015 (n. 3).
7   Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification.
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of the CJEU in cases concerning the interpretation of that Directive involv-
ing children.8 In other fields of EU law which deal with family reunification, 
the picture is even more obscure. In the early case law concerning the free 
movement of persons, explicit references to fundamental rights were made.9 
However more recently the CJEU paid no attention at all to fundamental rights 
in free movement of persons cases. In the much debated Ruiz Zambrano ruling 
and in the subsequent jurisprudence of the Court, there is no reference what-
soever to fundamental rights in general and the best interests of the child in 
particular.10 This is surprising since the subject matter of this body of case law 
concerns the (citizenship) rights of minor EU citizens. The research question 
in this paper is what the role of Article 24(2) Charter in EU family (re)unifica-
tion law is, and how this relates to (the obligations of Member States under) 
the CRC. In order to answer this question, the meaning of the best interests 
concept in the context of the right to family reunification is first assessed as 
a whole and also for the specific domain of EU family reunification law. After 
that, several levels of EU family reunification law are discussed, namely the 
Family Reunification Directive, the Citizenship Directive11 and EU citizenship 
law. Lastly, the implications of the Article 24 Charter in the context of the fam-
ily reunification of refugees and asylum seekers is sketched.
2 The Best Interests of the Child in EU Law
In order to assess the role of Article 24(2) Charter in EU family reunification 
law, in this section the context of Article 24(2) within the Charter is outlined. 
8    See section 3.2. of this paper.
9    See for instance CJEU, Baumbast and R., C-413/99, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, para. 72. In Zhu and 
Chen, the CJEU does not refer to fundamental rights law (CJEU, Zhu and Chen, C-200/02, 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639). AG Tizzano pointed out in his opinion that his proposal, which was 
largely followed by the Court, fully complied with the right to respect for family life and 
therefore it was not necessary to discuss it any further, implying that if a different conclu-
sion were reached, it would be necessary to consider fundamental rights. See the opinion 
of AG Tizzano, CJEU, Zhu and Chen, C-200/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:307, para. 130. For further 
analysis, see section 4.2 of this paper.
10   CJEU, Ruiz Zambrano, C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
11   Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 
on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and 
repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/
EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC.
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After that, it is ascertained what the obligation under Article 3(1) CRC entails, 
since this provision forms the basis of Article 24(2) Charter.12 As this is a vast 
topic, which Smyth has characterised as ‘notoriously problematic’ and ‘one of 
the most amorphous and least understood of legal concepts’,13 several aspects 
of this provision are analysed. The purpose of this assessment is essentially to 
determine what the obligations of Member States arising from Article 24(2) 
Charter are, specifically in relation to Article 3(1) CRC and the other substan-
tive provisions from that Convention.
2.1  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU acquired the status of primary EU law on 
equal footing with the treaties. Unlike human rights treaties like the ECHR, the 
scope of the Charter is limited. In Article 51(1) Charter it is laid down that the 
provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the EU and to Member States when they are implementing EU law. 
In Åkerberg Fransson, the CJEU held that Article 51(1) Charter must be under-
stood as conforming the previous case law of the Court on the extent to which 
Member States are bound by EU law when implementing EU law.14 Therefore 
the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union 
are applicable in all situations where national legislation falls within the scope 
of EU law.15 In order to determine whether a national measure falls within the 
scope of EU law, one must determine whether there is a direct link between 
the impugned national measure and an EU obligation.16 In NS, the CJEU held 
that Member States are also bound by the Charter when they implement a dis-
cretionary competence laid down in secondary EU law.17 The national courts 
also have to comply with their obligations concerning the protection of the 
fundamental rights of migrants.18 It is specifically laid down in the Charter that 
12   Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), p. 10.
13   Smyth, 2015 (n. 2), p. 71.
14   CJEU, Åkerberg Fransson, C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 18.
15   Ibid., para. 21. Hancox points out that it is still not crystal clear what the notion of the 
implementation of EU law exactly entails. Hancox, E., ‘The meaning of “implementing” 
EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg Fransson‘, 50 Common Market Law 
Review (2013) 1430.
16   Åkerberg Fransson, supra n. 14, para. 28–29.
17   CJEU, N.S. and others, C-411/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
18   Ibid., para. 94.
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none of its provisions extend the field of application of EU law or has the abil-
ity to establish a new power or task for it.19 Many of the Charter provisions 
resemble a provision from the ECHR, and in so far as this is the case, must 
be interpreted in line with the corresponding provision and the case law of 
the ECtHR.20 Nevertheless, Article 52(3) shall not prevent Union law providing 
more extensive protection.
Article 24(2) Charter codifies the best interests of the child concept as en-
shrined in Article 3(1) CRC in EU law. The text of the provision is more con-
cise than in the CRC: ‘In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public 
authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary 
consideration.’ Unlike the CRC, courts are not mentioned, but should be con-
sidered as public authorities.21 According to the Explanation relating to the 
Charter Article 24 is based on Articles 3 (best interests), 9 (unity of family), 
12 (participation) and 13 (expression) of the CRC.22 In Article 24 Charter, two 
other children’s rights are highlighted. Article 24(1) states that children have 
the right to protection and care necessary for their well-being and have the 
right that their views are taken into consideration. Article 24(3) establishes 
that every child has the right to maintain a personal relationship and direct 
contact with both his or her parents on a regular basis.
Article 24 Charter has been referred to by the CJEU a number of times. 
Most notably, the Court has held that transfers of unaccompanied minors in 
the context of the Dublin Regulation are not in line with Article 24(2) Charter, 
as it is not in the minor’s best interests to be transferred to another Member 
State.23 Article 24 Charter was also referred to by the CJEU in several family 
reunification cases, which are discussed below. Besides the Charter, the protec-
tion of children’s rights is stated as one of the objectives of the EU in Article 3 
TEU. This indicates the importance the legislature attached to the protection 
of children’s rights.
As there is limited jurisprudence on Article 24 Charter—which is based on 
Article 3(1) CRC—that latter provision is analysed below.
19   Article 51(2) Charter.
20   Article 52(3) Charter.
21   See Peers, S., T. Harvey, J. Kenner & A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2014), p. 687.
22   Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ 2007/C 303/02.
23   CJEU, MA, BT, DA, supra n. 4.
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2.2  UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
The best interests of the child concept is laid down in Article 3(1) CRC:
[I]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authori-
ties or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.
All elements of this provision can be the topic of extensive discussion, which 
are all relevant in the context of EU family reunification law. A question of 
particular relevance is whether an immigration decision constitutes an action 
concerning children in the context of Article 3(1) CRC. The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has held in numerous Concluding Observations that:
[…] [T]he best interests of the child is understood, appropriately inte-
grated and implemented in all legal provisions as well as in judicial and 
administrative decisions […] that have direct and indirect impact on 
children.24
It can safely be assumed that a decision on the lawful residence of a child in the 
territory of a state should be considered as an action which has a direct impact 
on children. Also, immigration decisions that are primarily directed against 
parents have an indirect impact on children. Immigration decisions affecting 
other family members—like siblings or grandparents—might, depending on 
the context of the case, also have a direct or indirect impact on children.
A second issue which arises is whether the best interests concept applies to 
situations in which there are different types of immigration proceedings taking 
place simultaneously. If the best interests of the child are taken into account 
by a Member State within the context of determining whether an immigra-
tion decision violates fundamental rights, must it also be taken into account 
in a decision on the applicability of EU law in a particular case? On this issue 
the wording of Article 3(1) is quite clear. ‘In all decisions affecting children’ 
can only mean that the principle applies in all decisions, even in situations 
in which the best interests of the child had already been assessed. Similar rea-
soning can be applied concerning sequential immigration decisions. If the best 
interests were assessed in a procedure at a particular moment in time, nothing 
in the text of the provision or in the comments by the Committee suggests that 
24   See for instance Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations Finland, 
2005, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.272, para. 21.
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it should not be assessed again in a subsequent immigration decision. In fact, 
as the passing of time plays an important role in the development of a child, 
it is likely that the mere elapsing of time influences the outcome of the best 
interests of the child determination. The fact that the legal context of a sub-
sequent immigration decision might be different—a first decision might con-
cern the application for a residence permit while a subsequent decision could 
concern a deportation decision—does not alter the content of the obligation 
to take the best interests of the child into account.
A third issue which is relevant to discuss is who should take the best in-
terests of the child into account in immigration decisions. In Article 3(1) it is 
stated that the best interests of the child should be taken into account by ‘so-
cial welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies’. In immigration decisions, it is usually the immigration service acting 
on behalf of the responsible administrative authority which takes individual 
immigration decisions. Such bodies should be regarded as ‘administrative au-
thorities’. Typically, after an initial decision has been taken, an applicant has 
the right to mount a legal challenge to this decision.25 The judicial body that 
handles this legal challenge should be regarded as a court of law within the 
context of Article 3(1). This means that this body has the obligation to consider 
the best interests of the child. The fact that at a different time in the procedure 
concerning the immigration decision the responsible administrative authority 
has already taken the best interests of the child into account, does not dimin-
ish the obligations the court of law has on this point. Any reasoning limiting 
the competence of a court of law in taking the best interests of the child into 
account is incompatible with Article 3(1), as this provision explicitly states that 
both administrative authorities and courts should take the best interests of the 
child into account.
The issues discussed above concern the scope of application of the best in-
terests of the child concept. The content and meaning of this concept is a com-
pletely different issue. The essential questions with regard to the best interests 
of the child in family reunification law are how to determine what is in the best 
interests of the child and how much weight should be afforded to this concept. 
Both these issues are discussed below.
With regard to the meaning of the best interests concept, two general ap-
proaches can be identified in the literature. The first approach is based on the 
welfare of a child and involves an assessment of whether a particular decision 
25   See for example Article 18 Family Reunification Directive.
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serves the welfare of the child.26 This approach was severely criticised for 
being normative27 and offering insufficient guidance to decision makers.28 On 
a more fundamental note, Smyth argues that a welfare-based understanding 
of the best interests concept contradicts the purpose of the CRC to make chil-
dren the bearers of individual rights.29 She follows General Recommendation 
14 of the Committee on the Rights of the Children30 and advocates a rights-
based approach based on the premise ‘that there is an intimate connection be-
tween the best interests of the child and the rights of the child.’31 Thus, the best 
interests concept should be understood as an umbrella provision for the rights 
of the child laid down in the Convention. According to Smyth and in conformi-
ty with General Comment 14,32 the best interests concept can have three dis-
tinct functions: (1) to be an interpretative device for other substantive rights, 
(2) to serve as a bridge between two rights, and (3) to serve as a mediator when 
there is a conflict of rights. These different functions of the best interests of the 
child concept will be used in Section 6 to evaluate what the potential is of 
the best interests concept in EU family reunification law.
With regard to how much weight should be afforded to the best interests of 
the child, it must be noted that immigration law is an odd man out since deter-
mining that a certain situation is in the child’s best interests does not mean that 
a right of residence exists for the child or his or her parents. Traditionally, states 
hold the sovereign right to control the entry and residence of foreign nationals 
in their territory. In the past decades, this state competence has somewhat de-
clined with the proliferation of human rights and the increasing implications 
of EU law for domestic immigration law. However, children’s rights are by no 
means a trump card to acquire some right of residence.33 Instead, both in the 
26   The origins of the approach can be traced back to pre-CRC common law traditions. For 
an overview, see Eekelaar, J., ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights’, 6(2) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies (1986) 161–182.
27   Parker, S., ‘The Best Interests of the Child—Principles and Problems’, 8(1) International 
Journal of Law and the Family (1994) 26.
28   Dolgin, J., Why has the Best Interests Standard Survived?: The Historic and Social Context’, 
16(1) Child Legal Rights Journal (1996) 2.
29   Smyth, 2014 (n. 2), p. 26.
30   Committee on the Rights of the Children, General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of 
the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), 
2013, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/14.
31   Smyth, 2014 (n. 2), p. 26.
32   General comment No. 14, supra note 31, para 6.
33   See also ECtHR 8 March 2016, 25960/13 (I.A.A. v. UK), para. 46, in which the ECtHR explic-
itly refers to the idea that the assumption that children would be better off if they were 
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context of human rights law as well as in the context of EU law, a balance must 
be struck between the legitimate interest of the state to control immigration 
and the individual rights of the applicants. To determine how much weight 
should be afforded to the best interests of the child is outside the scope of 
the research question addressed in this paper.34 Instead, in this contribution the 
role of Article 24(2) Charter in EU family reunification law is assessed in order 
to determine whether the Member States are offered sufficient guidance how 
that provision should be implemented in their national immigration law.
3 The Family Reunification Directive
3.1  Negotiations and Directive
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification is the only instru-
ment in international law that grants a clearly-defined subjective right to 
family reunification to applicants who comply with the conditions defined in 
the Directive. Initially received as a threat to fundamental rights, the Family 
Reunification Directive has developed into a minimum safeguard preventing 
Member States from placing further restrictions in their family reunification 
policies. Being one of the first instruments of the newly-acquired EU compe-
tence in the field of migration and asylum, the negotiation of the Directive 
took place in a highly politicised climate.35 Furthermore, at the time of the 
negotiations, the Directive was adopted in a legislative procedure in which 
the role of the European Parliament was limited to consultation and unanim-
ity was required among Member States. This resulted in difficult negotiations 
within the Council. The final result in 2003 was significantly different to the 
initial proposal by the Commission in 1999. However, the provision relating 
to the best interests of the child was not affected by this. Article 5(5) Family 
Reunification Directive reads:
living in the host state does not mean that this state is automatically required to admit the 
children concerned. On the other hand, in ECtHR 8 November 2016, 56971/10 (El Ghatet v. 
Switzerland), para. 46, the Court held that the best interests of the child must be placed at 
the heart of the considerations and crucial weight must be attached to it.
34   See Kalverboer, M.E., A.E. Zijlstra & E.J. Knorth, ‘The Developmental Consequences for 
Asylum-seeking Children Living with the Prospect for Five Years or More of Enforced 
return to their Home Country’, 11 European Journal of Migration and Law (2009) 41–67.
35   See Strik, T., De Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen: De wisselwerking tussen 
nationaal en Europees niveau (Den Haag, Boom, 2011), Chapter 3.
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When examining an application, the Member States shall have due re-
gard to the best interests of minor children.
This is a so-called horizontal clause meaning that all the provisions of the 
Directive should be read in line with this principle.
The Family Reunification Directive was the first instrument of EU law in 
which the Charter was referred to, despite that the Charter, at the time of the 
adoption of the Directive did not yet have binding force. In preamble 2 of 
the Directive it is stated that measures concerning family reunification should 
be adopted in conformity with the right to respect for private and family life as 
laid down in the ECHR and in the Charter.
3.2  Case Law
The European Parliament, which was only consulted during the negotiations 
of the Directive, challenged several provisions of the Directive before the 
CJEU.36 The contested provisions all concerned stand-still clauses, allowing 
some Member States to retain certain domestic rules while not allowing other 
Member States to introduce such rules. Two out of the three contested pro-
visions directly concerned children.37 The CJEU did not annul the contested 
provisions because they do not oblige Member States to violate human rights. 
The Court explicitly referred to the best interests of the child concept, as laid 
down in Article 5(5) Directive and Article 24(2) Charter. By not annulling the 
(contested provisions of the) Directive the Court ensured that the Directive, 
which ensures at least some level of harmonisation, remained in force.
The other case in which the best interests of the child concept plays a role 
is O., S. & L.38 This case concerned the family reunification of the partner of 
a third-country national lawfully residing in Finland. The sponsors in the 
case did not comply with the income requirement, which Member States are 
36   CJEU, Parliament v. Council, C-540/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429.
37   Article 4(1) allows the Member States to retain integration measures for children older 
than twelve and article 4(6) allows the Member States to retain a maximum age for the 
family reunification of children of fifteen years. It must be noted that only Member 
States which had these requirements prior to the adoption of the Directive are allowed 
to implement them. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on the application of the Directive 2003/86/EC on 
the right to family reunification, COM(2008)610 final, p. 5.
38   CJEU, O., S. & L., C-356/11 and C-357/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. This case is also relevant in the 
context of the application of the Ruiz Zambrano doctrine. See para. 5.2. of this paper for 
the analysis of this aspect of the case.
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allowed to impose under Article 7(1)(c) Family Reunification Directive.39 Even 
though it was clear that the sponsors relied on social assistance, the Court 
chose to emphasise that Member States may not apply the implementation 
of an instrument of EU law in such a way that it disregards fundamental rights 
such as the right to respect for family life (Article 7 Charter) and the best inter-
ests of the child (Article 24(2) Charter). Even though the CJEU leaves it to the 
referring court ‘to make a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the inter-
ests in play, taking particular account of the interests of the children concerned’,40 
it suggests here that the denial of a residence permit would not be in accor-
dance with the Directive.
In the other case law of the CJEU regarding the interpretation of the Family 
Reunification Directive, the CJEU did not refer to the best interests of the child 
concept.
The Noorzia case concerns the moment that an applicant for family reuni-
fication needs to comply with the age requirement.41 The Court held that it 
is in accordance with the Directive for Member States to require that the age 
requirement is complied with at the time of the application for family reuni-
fication. The Court based this conclusion on the assertion that the effect of 
such implementation does not contradict the purpose of the requirement, 
which is to prevent forced marriages and to promote integration in the host 
state.42 Despite that this particular case did not concern children, the CJEU 
could still have emphasised that the age requirement should be implement-
ed in accordance with fundamental rights including the best interests of the 
child. By omitting such reasoning, it seems that Member States may require 
the age requirement to be fulfilled on the moment of lodging the application 
in all applications, disregarding the best interests of the child. In an applica-
tion concerning children, it could very well be that a strict adherence to the 
age requirement to be fulfilled at the time of application would not be in ac-
cordance with the best interests of the child. Nevertheless, the CJEU chose not 
to refer to this in any way.
39   The income requirement was also the topic of the seminal Chakroun case. CJEU, 
Chakroun, C-578/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:117. However, as this case did not involve children, 
the best interests of the child concept was not discussed. In this case the other horizontal 
provision of the Directive—Article 17 which obliges the Member States to take individual 
circumstances into account—played an important role.
40   Ibid., para. 81.
41   CJEU, Noorzia, C-338/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2092.
42   Ibid., para. 16.
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Also in the K. & A. case, the Court refrained from referring to the best in-
terests of the child concept.43 The reason for this could be that the particular 
cases referred to the Court did not concern (minor) children. However, not 
mentioning the best interests concept ignores the fact that other cases con-
cerning integration exams as an admission requirement potentially do in-
volve children. The CJEU concluded that Member States may impose such a 
requirement under Article 7(2) Directive, but only to such an extent that it 
does not render the right to family reunification impossible or excessively dif-
ficult. In the Netherlands the requirement was only waived if a combination 
of exceptional circumstances applied. The Court found this implementation of 
Article 7(2) to be too strict. Nowhere in the ruling did the Court refer to the 
best interests of the child, nor for that matter to fundamental rights in gen-
eral. This is surprising because in the early rulings on the interpretation of the 
Family Reunification Directive, the Court did refer to this and gave it an impor-
tant role in its reasoning. In K. & A. the lack of reference to the best interests 
of the child principle indicates that the Court chooses to solve the question 
by referring to the effectiveness of the Directive and its objectives, and not by 
invoking human rights.
3.3  Guidelines from the European Commission
In 2014, the European Commission published a communication containing 
guidance on the interpretation of the Family Reunification Directive.44 The 
Communication was a follow-up to a Green Paper in which the Commission 
asked all stakeholders to present their views on selected questions relating to 
the Directive.45 In the Communication, the Commission provided its own 
interpretation concerning different provisions in the Directive.46 It must be 
noted that the Communication is not legally binding.
At several points in the Communication, the Commission refers to the best 
interests of the child concept. With regard to the age requirement, the Com-
mission states that Member States must take the best interests of the child 
into account on a case-by-case basis when imposing an age requirement. This 
43   CJEU, K. & A., C-153/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:453.
44   COM(2014)210 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on guidance for application of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to fam-
ily reunification.
45   COM(2011)735 final, Green Paper on the right to family reunification of third-country 
nationals living in the European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC).
46   See Klaassen, M., G. Lodder & P. Rodrigues, ‘Groenboek gezinshereniging: geen herzien-
ing nodig, wel correcte implementatie’, Asiel & Migrantenrecht (2012) 4–13.
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as such is not at odds with the Noorzia case, in which the best interests of the 
child was not referred to. With regard to administrative fees that are charged 
for an application for family reunification—a topic that is not covered by the 
Directive—the Commission proposes that Member States, for the purpose 
of promoting the best interests of the child, should not require the payment of 
administrative fees in applications concerning minors. The Commission fur-
thermore provides comments in a separate paragraph of the Communication 
on the best interests of the child in general. In this paragraph, the Commission 
summarises the findings from case law as analysed in the previous section of 
this paper.
4 The Citizenship Directive
The free movement of persons is one of the four fundamental freedoms within 
EU law. The CJEU has traditionally been a main propagator of the free move-
ment of persons. The legal basis for the free movement of persons is dispersed 
in the Treaty. In Article 21 TFEU it is laid down that every citizen of the EU has 
the right to move freely and reside within the territory of the EU. Furthermore, 
a right to free movement can be derived from the free movement of workers 
(Article 45) and the free movement of establishment (Article 49).
4.1 Directive 2004/38/EC and its Predecessors
In Directive 2004/38/EC it is laid down that an expulsion may only be ordered 
against children if there are imperative grounds concerning public security.47 
This places children on an equal footing with EU citizens who have remained 
in a Member State for a period of ten years with the strongest level of protec-
tion against expulsion possible under the Directive. No case law by the CJEU 
exists concerning the expulsion of children. The case law existing on impera-
tive grounds of public security in general suggests that the threshold is set at 
such a high level that it is difficult to imagine under what circumstances it 
would be allowed to expel a child under the Directive.48
47   Article 28(3)(b) Directive 2004/38/EC.
48   See CJEU, PI, C-348/09, ECLI:EU:C:2012:300, and CJEU, Tsakouridis, C-145/09, ECLI:EU: 
C:2010:708 on respectively serious sexual offenses against children and serious drugs 
related offenses.
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4.2 Early Case Law
There are several cases concerning the free movement of persons in which 
children were involved. In most of those cases, the Citizenship Directive was 
not applicable, but the Court based the right of residence of the (parents of 
the) children directly on a Treaty provision.
In Carpenter, the CJEU granted a derived right of residence to the Philippine 
national spouse of a United Kingdom national residing in his Member State 
of origin.49 The applicant played an important role in the upbringing of the 
sponsor’s children while the sponsor was providing services in other Member 
States. The CJEU held that the sponsor would not be free to exercise his fun-
damental freedom to provide services to another Member State if his spouse 
were not allowed to live with him.50 Any restrictions in the exercise of the 
fundamental freedom to provide services must be compatible with other fun-
damental rights, including the right to respect for family life as laid down in 
Article 8 ECHR.51 The decision to deport the applicant would not strike a fair 
balance between the competing interests at stake.52
The CJEU does not refer explicitly to the best interests of the child concept 
in this ruling, but instead bases its reasoning on Article 8 ECHR.53 The manner 
in which the CJEU refers to fundamental rights, however, shows that when a 
case is within the scope of EU law, fundamental rights apply and restrictions 
on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms must be in accordance with 
fundamental rights.
A similar approach is taken by the CJEU in Baumbast and R. concerning 
the free movement of persons.54 This case is a joined case of two separate dis-
putes in which for different reasons the situation arose that the minor children 
had a right of residence in the United Kingdom but the parent(s) did not. The 
question addressed to the Court was essentially about the right of residence 
of the parent(s). The Court held that if the parents of the children who had 
a right of residence under EU law were refused residence, the children might 
be deprived of their right of residence.55 Regulation 1612/68 (now Directive 
2004/38/EC), on which the right of residence of the children is based, must 
49   CJEU, Carpenter, C-60/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434.
50   Ibid., para. 39.
51   Ibid., para. 40.
52   Ibid., para. 43.
53   The case precedes the Charter, so the CJEU could not have referred to that instrument 
instead.
54   Baumbast and R., supra n. 9.
55   Ibid., para. 71.
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be interpreted in the light of the right to respect for family life as laid down in 
Article 8 ECHR.56 According to the Court, refusing to grant a right of residence 
to the primary caretaker of a child with a right of residence based on EU law, 
infringes the right to respect for family life.57 As in Carpenter, the Court did not 
explicitly refer to the best interests of the child, but still held that restrictions 
on the exercise of EU rights must respect Article 8 ECHR.
In Zhu and Chen the CJEU did not explicitly refer to fundamental rights like 
it did in Baumbast and R.58 This case concerned a Chinese mother who gave 
birth to a child in Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. As a result, pursu-
ant to Irish nationality law, the child acquired Irish nationality. The child and 
her mother relied on the Irish nationality of the child to acquire a right of resi-
dence in the United Kingdom. The CJEU observed that Directive 90/36459 does 
grant a right of residence to the dependent family members of an EU citizen, 
but not to the family members the EU citizen is dependent on.60 However, as 
the right of the minor EU citizen to reside in the United Kingdom would be 
deprived of useful effect if his primary caretaker were not allowed residence, 
the right to freely move and reside within the territory of the EU in combina-
tion with the Free Movement Directive must be read in such a way that this 
caretaker must be in the position to reside with the child.61 Where this conclu-
sion is the same as in Baumbast and R., in the latter case the Court extensively 
referred to fundamental rights in arriving at this conclusion.
More than ten years after Chen, the Court considered the principles estab-
lished in the rulings discussed above again in S. & G.62 This case concerned 
two separate disputes concerning the right of residence of a third-country 
national family member with an EU citizen residing in his home Member 
State. In the case of S., the sponsor was living and working in the Netherlands 
but preparing and conducting business visits to Belgium and was seeking 
the residence of his third-country national mother-in-law. In the case of G. the 
sponsor was living in the Netherlands but working for a Belgian company in 
Belgium and was seeking residence for his third-country national spouse. The 
Court held that Directive 2004/38/EC was not applicable because the sponsor 
resided in his Member State of origin. Both cases were however within the 
56   Ibid., para. 72.
57   Ibid., para. 73.
58   Zhu and Chen, supra n. 9.
59   This Directive was later replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC.
60   Zhu and Chen, supra note 10, para. 44.
61   Ibid., para. 45.
62   CJEU, S. & G., C-457/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:136.
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scope of the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU) as any EU national 
under an employment contract working in a Member State other than that of 
their place of residence falls within the scope of this provision.63 The CJEU left 
it up to the domestic courts to determine whether the refusal of residence to 
the third-country national family member would dissuade the EU citizen from 
making use of his free movement of worker rights. The Court, however, did add 
that ‘[the] mere fact that it might appear desirable that the child be cared for by 
the third-country national who is the direct relative in the ascending line of the 
Union citizen’s spouse is not therefore sufficient in itself to constitute such a dis-
suasive effect’.64 The CJEU refrains from making any reference to fundamental 
rights in this case. Considering that this case specifically concerns the right of a 
family to live together, it is surprising that the Court does not make a reference 
to the fact that Member States are under the obligation to respect family life. 
Article 7 Charter fully applies in this case and the domestic court must take it 
into account in making the final assessment.65
4.3  Implicit Recognition of the Best Interests Concept
The best interests of the child concept was not mentioned explicitly in any of 
the cases discussed above. However, this does not mean that it did not play any 
sort of a role in the reasoning of the Court. In both Chen and Baumbast & R. 
the CJEU held that the right of the children to reside in the United Kingdom 
would be deprived of its useful effect if the primary caretaker were not allowed 
residence there. Deconstructing this premise shows that it is the right of the 
child to live with its primary caretaker which is the causal link with the useful 
effect of the right of residence of the child. The idea that a child cannot live on 
its own originated in the basic notion that a child should be with its parents.
5 Citizenship and Family Reunification
Since 2011 the case law of the CJEU on EU citizenship has also effectively 
been a source for family reunification law. The Court held in the seminal Ruiz 
Zambrano case that an EU citizen may not be forced to leave the territory of 
the EU. It has confirmed this aspect of citizenship rights in its subsequent case 
law. In all the cases until now, no reference was made to the best interests 
of the child concept. Below it is assessed whether the best interests concept 
63   Ibid., para. 39.
64   Ibid., para. 43.
65   See CJEU, N.S., supra n. 17, para. 94 and section 2.1 of this contribution.
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should nevertheless be regarded as the driving force behind the reasoning in 
Ruiz Zambrano.
5.1  The Ruiz Zambrano Ruling
Traditionally, the CJEU has held that a situation in which there is no meaning-
ful link with EU law falls outside the scope of EU law and therefore EU law is not 
applicable in such ‘purely internal situations’.66 This changed, however, after 
the Belgian Supreme Court referred questions for a preliminary ruling in the 
case of the Ruiz Zambrano family.67 The case concerns the right of residence 
in Belgium of a Colombian family.68 The parents and the oldest child arrived 
in Belgium where they unsuccessfully applied for asylum. While in Belgium, 
two more children were born. Since Belgian nationality law at that time pro-
vided Belgian nationality to children who would otherwise become stateless if 
they were not granted Belgian nationality, the two youngest children obtained 
the Belgian nationality. The Belgian Supreme Court asked the CJEU whether a 
right of residence can be derived for the parents of the Belgian and therewith 
EU national children in this case based on Article 18 TFEU (the prohibition 
of discrimination based on nationality), Article 20 TFEU (the establishment of 
EU citizenship for all citizens of the Member States) and Article 21 TFEU (the 
free movement of EU citizens in the Member States of the EU) read separately 
or in conjunction. After observing that Directive 2004/38/EC is not applicable 
in this case, the Court established that national measures which deprive EU 
citizens from the enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue 
of their status of EU citizen are not permissible.69 The right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the EU is part of the substance of these rights. 
Accordingly, a measure which has the effect that an EU citizen is forced to 
leave the territory of the EU is not permissible. Based on this, the CJEU estab-
lished that the refusal of the right to reside in Belgium for the parents of the 
minor EU citizens in this case would deprive the children from the enjoyment 
of the rights attached to their EU citizenship.70
66   See for instance CJEU, Morson, C-35/82, ECLI:EU:C:1982:368.
67   See Eijken, H. van, European Citizenship and the Constitutionalisation of the European 
Union (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2014), p. 192.
68   Ruiz Zambrano, supra n. 10. For a further analysis of this ruling, see for instance Elsuwege, 
P. van & D. Kochenov, ‘On The Limits of Judicial Intervention: EU Citizenship and Family 
Reunification Rights’, 13 European Journal of Migration and Law (2011) 443–466.
69   Ruiz Zambrano, supra n. 10, para. 42.
70   Ibid., para. 44.
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In its preliminary questions, the Belgian Supreme Court referred twice to 
Article 24 Charter. The CJEU, however, did not refer to fundamental rights in 
general and Article 24 Charter in particular at all. Instead, it based its entire 
reasoning on EU citizenship, creating the situation that in the determination 
of whether the parents of an EU citizen child can stay in the EU, children’s 
rights do not play any (explicit) role.
5.2  Subsequent Case Law
The Court confirmed this approach with regard to the lack of referring to fun-
damental and children’s rights in the subsequent case law. One of the cases 
of the Dereci and others ruling concerned a Turkish national who had entered 
Austria illegally after which he married an Austrian national with whom he 
had two children.71 The question addressed by the Court was whether he could 
derive a right of residence in Austria from the EU citizenship status of his two 
children. The Court repeated that EU citizens may not be forced to leave the 
territory of the EU. It then held that the fact that it may be desirable for eco-
nomic reasons or in order to keep the family together is itself not sufficient to 
lead to a situation in which the EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the 
EU.72 The Court held that in any case, whether or not there is a derived right of 
residence, there should be an assessment of whether the denial of residence 
is in accordance with fundamental rights.73 If the situation at hand is covered 
by EU law, the Member State must examine whether a refusal of the right to 
residence would undermine the right to family and private life of Article 7 
Charter. If the situation is not covered by EU law, the Member State must ex-
amine whether a refusal of right to residence would be in violation of Article 8 
ECHR.74 The Court presented this as an either/or issue, and left the decision 
in this particular case to the referring court. In the entire ruling, like in Ruiz 
Zambrano, the Court did not refer to the best interests of the child concept.
The principle point which is not addressed by the Court is how the refer-
ring Court should determine whether the EU citizen children of the applicant 
would be forced to leave the territory of the EU if their Turkish father is de-
nied a right of residence. Would the children be in a situation in which they 
are forced to leave the territory of the EU if their Austrian mother decided to 
follow her husband to Turkey? Is the situation in which the children are sepa-
rated from their father because they are deemed to be able to remain with their 
71   CJEU, Dereci, C-256/11, ECLI:EU:C:2011:734.
72   Ibid., para. 66.
73   Ibid., para. 69.
74   Ibid., para. 72.
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mother in Austria while their father is forced to return to Turkey, in accordance 
with fundamental rights and is this situation covered by EU law? The referring 
court is left in the dark on these issues.
A further interesting case to discuss in this regard is O., S. and L., discussed 
in Section 3.2 above in the context of the Family Reunification Directive.75 This 
case concerned an application for family reunification by a third-country na-
tional sponsor to be joined by her new partner who was also a third-country 
national, where the resident sponsor had a child from a previous marriage who 
had Finnish and therewith EU nationality. The sponsor and her new partner in 
the case also had a common child, who did not acquire Finnish nationality.76 
The question which arose was whether a right of residence existed for the new 
partner of the sponsor based on the EU citizenship of her child. The dilemma 
the Court observed is that if the sponsor decided to take her child and live 
in the country of origin of her new partner, the ties between the Finnish child 
and her father would be ruptured. On the other hand, if the mother remained 
in Finland—which she is entitled to because of her residence permit there—
she would rupture the ties between her youngest child and his father. Like in 
Ruiz Zambrano and Dereci and others, the central question was whether the 
EU citizen minor would be forced to leave the territory of the EU if the right 
of residence were denied to the new partner of his mother. According to the 
Court, the key to the answer to this question lies in the dependency of the EU 
citizen minor on the new partner of their mother. If the EU national child is de-
pendent to such an extent on that new partner that he would be forced to leave 
the territory of the EU if that person were not allowed residence in Finland, a 
derived right of residence would exist for the new partner.77 The Court allowed 
itself to suggest that, based on the information available, there might be no 
such dependency in the case at hand.78
Like in Ruiz Zambrano and Dereci and others, there is no reference to the 
best interests of the child concept in the part of the ruling that concerns the 
question whether the EU citizen minor would be forced to leave the territory of 
the EU if the new partner of the mother did not acquire a derived right of resi-
dence. There is such reference in the part of the ruling that concerns the Family 
Reunification Directive. This raises an interesting question. If the applicant in 
this case made two different applications, assuming that this is possible in do-
mestic law, the best interests of the child concept—being a fundamental right 
75   O., S. & L., supra n. 38.
76   In the reference, two domestic cases are joined. The facts of the cases are similar.
77   Ibid., para. 56.
78   Ibid., para. 57.
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under EU law—would be taken into account in the application concerning 
the Family Reunification Directive, but would not be taken into account in the 
context of the application based on the Ruiz Zambrano doctrine. Apparently, 
for the applicability of the best interests of the child concept, it depends on 
what type of EU law is invoked.
5.3  The Role of the Charter
In the cases discussed above, the Court refrains from referring to fundamental 
rights in general and the best interests of the child principle in particular. The 
reluctance of the Court to consider fundamental rights in this case could be ex-
plained by the fear that a broad interpretation of attaching residence rights to 
the status of EU citizenship could have large implications for the Member States 
which would be detrimental for the legitimacy of the Court itself. However, 
the manner in which the Court attempts to limit the implications of the Ruiz 
Zambrano doctrine is not convincing and unnecessarily confusing. It could be 
argued that the Charter is not applicable to the determination of whether a 
child is forced to leave the territory of the EU if his or her parent(s) were denied 
the right of residence because this would mean that the Charter would extend 
the scope of EU law in this regard, which would not be in accordance with 
Article 51(2) Charter. This argument must however be rejected. The relevant 
question is whether a situation is covered by EU law. A situation is only within 
the scope of EU law, if this follows from either primary or secondary EU law. 
Pursuant to Article 51(2), the Charter is not able to extend the scope of EU law. It 
cannot be argued that on the basis of the Charter, a situation which is not 
within the scope of EU law by virtue of specific provisions in either the trea-
ties or in secondary EU law, comes within the scope of EU law. However, if a 
Member State is implementing EU law, it is bound by the Charter.79 Before 
Ruiz Zambrano, such cases were regarded to be a ‘purely internal situation’ in 
which EU law was simply not applicable. After Ruiz Zambrano, a Member State 
must ascertain that the denial of the right to residence to the parent(s) of an 
EU national would not result in that EU national being forced to leave the ter-
ritory of the EU. The assessment of whether this is the case is only relevant 
within the context of EU law. This makes the determination of whether an EU 
citizen is forced to leave the territory of the EU an assessment which is within 
the scope of EU law. Holding that the Charter is applicable in such an assess-
ment does not mean that the Charter is extending the scope of EU law. That 
was already done by the Court in Ruiz Zambrano based on the direct effect of 
79   Article 51(1) Charter.
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Article 21 TFEU. Holding that the Charter is not applicable in the determina-
tion of whether an EU national is forced to leave the territory of the EU is based 
on an incorrect interpretation of the Charter itself.
5.4  Implicit Recognition of the Best Interests Concept
As mentioned above, the Court does not refer to the best interests of the child 
concept in Ruiz Zambrano and the subsequent rulings. This is surprising con-
sidering that all these cases concern an EU national child whose parent(s) 
are threatened in their residence rights. It seems logical that, considering the 
fact that the best interests principle is not only codified in Article 24 Charter 
but that it is also the cornerstone of the CRC to which all EU Member States are 
bound, the best interests principle is involved in the assessment of whether a 
child is forced to leave the territory of the EU.
A closer consideration of the facts in Ruiz Zambrano however reveals that 
perhaps implicitly the best interests concept was in fact still the prevailing 
consideration. Why would the children of the Ruiz Zambrano family be forced 
to leave the territory of the EU if their parents were denied the right of resi-
dence in Belgium? Could they not stay in Belgium with someone else, for ex-
ample with a foster family? Apparently it is so straightforward for the Court 
that the residence rights of children is illusory if their parent(s) are not allowed 
residence that it does not even consider this question. This begs the question 
on what the assumed necessity of the residence of the parents is based.
The answer to this question can only be that children have the right to be 
with their parents. The right to respect for family life is firmly rooted in human 
rights law. Furthermore, Article 9(1) CRC clearly states that a child may not be 
separated from his parents against his own will. The Court clearly considers 
that the right of residence of a child would be illusory if his parent(s) were not 
allowed residence. By doing so, it implicitly holds that a child belongs with his 
or her parents. Acknowledging this by actually including the best interests of 
the child principle in the determination of whether a child would be forced to 
leave the territory of the EU would be beneficial to shed light on the question 
of how to deal with families in which one parent of the parents of an EU na-
tional is also an EU national while the other parent is a third-country national.
5.5  Remaining Challenges
None of the cases discussed above deal with the question whether a derived 
right of residence exists in the situation that one of the parents is an EU na-
tional residing in his home Member State while the other parent is a third-
country national. The Dutch Administrative High Court has referred questions 
for preliminary ruling concerning eight families of an EU national child with 
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one third-country national parent.80 The case concerns different factual 
circumstances.
The reference to the Court shows that in each of the eight cases there are 
different reasons to question whether a child would be forced to leave the terri-
tory of the EU if his or her third-country national parent were denied residence 
in the Netherlands. In the first case the third-country national mother was 
forced to leave the home of the Dutch national father. In the second case, the 
Dutch father did not have his own accommodation and income. In the third 
case, the Dutch father lived in a special care housing arrangement as a result 
of which his child could not live with him. In the fourth case, the Dutch father 
had emigrated to Costa Rica and his current whereabouts were unknown. In 
the fifth case, at the request of the Dutch father, there was no contact between 
father and child. In the sixth case, there was contact between the Dutch father 
and his child, but the father was unable to pay child support because he did 
not have his own income. In the seventh case, the Dutch father, who took care 
of his child at the weekends, had a full-time job so he could not take care of his 
child during the week. In the eight cases, there was daily contact between the 
Dutch father and his child, but the father had declared that he was not willing 
to provide for the daily care of his child. This overview shows that there can be 
many reasons why an EU national parent is not able to take care of an EU na-
tional child, forcing the child to follow his or her third-country national parent 
were she to be deported.
In deciding how it should deal which such situations, the Court is tempted 
to explicitly consider the right to respect for family life and the best interests of 
the child of the children concerned in this example. Until now, the Court has 
left the actual decision of whether a child would be forced to leave the territory 
of the EU if a third-country national was denied residence in the Member State 
up to the referring domestic court to decide. In doing so, because the Court 
abstained from referring to fundamental rights, the only guidance provided by 
the Court is that the relevant question is whether a child would be forced to 
leave the EU. As the Court is now faced with a series of cases in which the ques-
tion referred to the Court actually is whether these children would be forced 
to leave the territory of the EU, it is likely that it will provide more guidance on 
this pressing issue.
Advocate-General Szpunar makes the best interests of the child the starting 
point in his analysis of the questions referred to the Court.81 He argues that 
the mere fact that the Dutch father is present in the Netherlands does not 
80   CJEU, Chavez Vilchez, C-133/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:354. The judgment of the Court was 
delivered on 10 May 2017, after the final formatting of this submission.
81   CJEU, Chavez Vilchez, C-133/15, Opinion of Advocate-General Szpunar.
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automatically mean that the child would be deprived of the genuine enjoy-
ment of its rights as an EU citizen. This requires an analysis of the domestic 
courts of whether the removal of the third country national parent complies 
with the proportionality principle.82 In making the proportionality assess-
ment, the Advocate General suggests that national interests concerning immi-
gration, the rights of EU citizens, the best interests of the child and the rights 
derived from national family law must be taken into account.83 He identifies 
the dependence between the third country national parent and the EU citizen 
child as the main element in the balancing of interests.84
6 Refugees and the Right to Family Reunification
Refugees have specific needs relating to family reunification. Where for ‘regu-
lar’ applicants for family reunification, the argument can be maintained that 
the right to respect for family life can also be exercised in the country of origin, 
this can often not be expected from refugees. For that purpose, refugees are ex-
empted to comply with substantive requirements to family reunification in the 
Family Reunification Directive. Due to a compromise during the negotiation 
of the Directive, this exemption does however not extent to holders of sub-
sidiary protection. There are several issues relating to the family reunification 
of children for which Article 24(2) Charter is relevant. Firstly, it can take very 
long before a decision on an application for family reunification by a refugee 
is taken. Secondly, there are practical difficulties for children to enforce the 
proper application of the Dublin III Regulation.
6.1 Lengthy Asylum and Family Reunification Procedures
Especially for asylum seekers whose family members are left behind in danger-
ous areas, expeditious asylum and family reunification procedures are of spe-
cific importance. According to Article 10(1) CRC the application by a child or 
his or her parents to enter a State Party for the purpose of family reunification 
shall be dealt with in a positive, human and expeditious manner.85 Both the 
Asylum Procedures Directive and the Family Reunification Directive provide 
82   Ibid., para. 95.
83   Ibid., para. 96.
84   Ibid., para. 97.
85   Furthermore, in case the child itself qualifies for international protection, states are 
required to take appropriate measures to ensure that appropriate protection and 
humanitarian assistance is provided. See Article 22(1) CRC.
Klaassen and Rodrigues��4
European Journal of Migration and Law �9 (�0�7) �9�–��8
for a maximum period to determine an application for asylum or family reuni-
fication. Article 31(3) Asylum Procedures Directive prescribes that an asylum 
procedure normally may not take longer than six months, but that this period 
may be prolonged with another nine months in case of a large number of si-
multaneous applications. Article 5(2) Family Reunification Directive lays down 
that the examination of an application for family reunification may not take 
longer than nine months. This means that an asylum seeker who qualifies for 
international protection may need to wait two years before a decision on fam-
ily reunification is taken.86 Of course this all depends on whether the Member 
States make use of the maximum periods prescribed by the directives. These 
relatively long periods for examining applications for asylum and family reuni-
fication may be an incentive for family members to attempt to travel irregular-
ly to the Member State concerned. Furthermore, it could lead to a race to the 
bottom among the Member States: by increasing the duration of the process-
ing of applications for asylum and family reunification, the Member States can 
create an unattractive reception climate aimed at discouraging asylum seek-
ers to apply for international protection in a particular Member State. There 
has not yet been any case law on the length of procedures, partly because it 
is difficult to litigate the lengths of the procedure as these maximum exami-
nation periods are determined by the directives themselves. Nevertheless, the 
question can be raised whether the full use of the examination periods in both 
directives may lead to a situation which violates Article 24(2) Charter. The best 
interests of the child principle requires that it is determined in each applica-
tion whether the (maximum) use of the examination period is in accordance 
with EU law.
6.2 Enforcing the Dublin III Regulation
According to the Dublin III Regulation,87 the Member State in which family 
members have obtained or applied for international protection is responsible 
for handling the asylum procedures of other family members.88 The presence 
86   The ECtHR has held that Article 8 ECHR contains the positive obligation to examine 
applications for international protection within a short time in order to limit the precari-
ous and uncertain situation asylum seekers find themselves in to a minimum. See ECtHR 
13 October 2016, 11981/15 (B.A.C. v. Greece), para. 37.
87   Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State re-
sponsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180/31 
(Dublin III Regulation).
88   Article 9 and 10 Dublin III Regulation.
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of family members is the highest in the hierarchy of criteria in determining 
which Member State is responsible to examine an application for international 
protection. The Member States have the obligation to examine each applica-
tion for international protection.89 However, in practice it is sometimes dif-
ficult for minor asylum seekers to make an asylum claim and start the asylum 
procedure. The application of the family reunion clauses in the Dublin III 
Regulation is only triggered when a Member States makes a take charge re-
quest to another Member State. Without a take charge request, an individual 
asylum applicant does not have the right to initiate proceedings under the 
Dublin III Regulation. This creates a protection gap in which an individual ap-
plicant may be eligible for transfer under the Dublin III Regulation, but does 
not have the ability to enforce this. This situation is particularly problematic 
for minor asylum seekers with family members in another Member States who 
find themselves in a situation that the Member State of residence for one rea-
son or another does not make a take charge request.
An example of such a situation occurred in the clandestine asylum camp 
near the French port of Calais, also referred to as ‘The Jungle’. There were sev-
eral minor asylum seekers who would qualify to be transferred to the United 
Kingdom if France would make a take charge request. However in the absence 
of such take charge request, these minors found themselves in a situation 
that they were unable to travel to the United Kingdom. Several minor asylum 
seekers sought redress against this directly in the United Kingdom on human 
rights grounds. On 20 January 2016, the UK Upper Tribunal held that the United 
Kingdom was under the positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR to allow the 
applicants to enter the United Kingdom to resume family life with their fam-
ily members already present there. Subsequently, the applicants were allowed 
entry to the United Kingdom and were granted refugee status. On 2 August 
2016 the Court of Appeal provided important nuances to the decision of the 
Upper Tribunal on points of law, however the minors which were granted a 
refugee status were allowed to remain. The Court of Appeal held that in prin-
ciple applicants for international protection must first attempt to apply for 
protection and subsequently for a take charge request in the Member States in 
which they are present. Only after it is demonstrated that there is no effective 
way of proceeding in that Member State may a request be made in the United 
Kingdom itself.90
89   Article 3(1) Dublin III Regulation.
90   Secretary of State for the Home Department v ZAT & Ors (Syria) [2016] EWCA Civ 810 
(02 August 2016), para 95.
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The solution found in ZAT is at odds with the system of the Dublin III 
Regulation, which takes the initiative of the Member States to make a take 
charge request as the starting point. However, Article 17(1) allows the Member 
States to examine each application for international protection it receives. 
This discretionary competence would normally be invoked by the Member 
States when an asylum seeker is already within its territory, but nothing in 
the Regulation suggests that a Member State is not allowed to assume re-
sponsibility over an asylum request when the asylum seeker is not yet present 
in the Member State. The CJEU held that Member States are also bound by 
the Charter when (not) exercising a discretionary competence under second-
ary EU law.91 Article 6(1) requires that the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration for Member States with respect to all procedures pro-
vided for in this Regulation. ZAT provides a possible solution to minors which 
do not have any enforceable rights under the Regulation itself to be able to 
effectuate their rights based on Article 8 ECHR. It can however be argued that 
such solution—to a problem that is essentially caused by the operation of the 
Dublin III Regulation, should be found within EU law itself. In order to prevent 
a situation in which minors are prevented from access to justice and to make 
sure that Article 24(2) Charter is sufficiently safeguarded, this issue should be 
brought to the ECJ through a preliminary reference.
7 Obligations of the Member States and the CJEU under the CRC
The Family Reunification Directive, the Free Movement of Persons Directive 
and the direct effect of TFEU provisions are all sources of obligations based 
on EU law. However, the Member States are also bound directly by the CRC. 
In all actions concerning children, the best interests of the child should be a 
primary consideration.92 This means that, irrespective of the discussion of the 
meaning of Article 24(2) Charter within EU law, the Member States are also 
bound by the CRC when implementing EU law. The Member States should 
implement EU law in accordance with the CRC. This means that even if a con-
sideration of children’s rights is not required within the context of the relevant 
instrument of EU law, under the CRC the Member States, including legislative 
bodies and courts of law, are still required to make the best interests of the 
child a primary consideration. Considering that the obligations of the Member 
States under the discussed sources of EU law are not absolute—none of the 
91   CJEU 21 January 2011, C-411/10, (N.S.).
92   Article 3(1) UN CRC. See the analysis in section 2 of this paper.
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instruments discussed above oblige a Member State to reject an application 
for family reunification—it is entirely unproblematic that the Member States 
must act in accordance with the CRC when implementing EU law in the field of 
family reunification. The interaction of EU law and the CRC in domestic law is 
unproblematic because there are no conflicts of law. This does, however, mean 
that both sources of law cannot be regarded in isolation.
Even though the best interests of the child, as enshrined in Article 3(1) CRC, 
is one of the cornerstones of the Convention, it should be read in accordance 
with the other provisions of the CRC.93 Currently, where the CJEU does make 
a reference to the best interests of the child, it is not linked to any other provi-
sion of the CRC. The best interests concept is mentioned in general terms—see 
the reference to the best interests concept in Parliament v. Council—but this 
is not further elaborated upon. As it remains unclear how the Member States 
should apply the best interests concept as an obligation arising from EU law, 
they do not have sufficient guidelines on how to implement this concept in 
national law.
One other line of reasoning is along Article 6(3) TEU, which obliges that 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute gen-
eral principles of EU law. Advocate-General Szpunar followed this route in his 
conclusion to the cases Rendón Marin and CS.94 He refers to the case law of the 
ECtHR and concludes that it must be determined whether there are any excep-
tional circumstances that warrant a finding that the national authorities have 
failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests, in particular the 
interests of the children in maintaining their family life of Article 8 ECHR in 
the Member State in question. The consequences which such a decision might 
have for the children must therefore be taken into account. In weighing the 
interests at stake, the best interests of the children must be taken into account. 
Particular attention must be paid to their age, their situation in the country or 
countries concerned and the extent to which they are dependent on their par-
ents. We have to note that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with respect to the 
best interests of the child is based on Article 3(1) CRC which is incorporated in 
Article 8 ECHR according to the ECtHR in Nunez.95
When the CJEU is answering preliminary questions concerning the Ruiz 
Zambrano doctrine, is there any reason the Court should not take Article 3(1) 
93   General Comment no. 14, supra note 31, para. 16.
94   CJEU, Rendón Marin and C.S., C-165/14 and C-304/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:75, opinion of the 
Advocate-General Szpunar, para. 174.
95   ECtHR 28 June 2011, 55597/09 (Nunez v. Norway).
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CRC into account? The ECHR constitutes general principles of EU law and as 
discussed before, Article 3(1) CRC is incorporated in Article 8 ECHR. The CJEU 
is not a member of the CRC, nor of the EU, but both should take general prin-
ciples of Union law into account. If the Court is denying the applicability of 
Article 24(2) Charter because of its restricted perception of its judicial task, 
is there no obligation to take into account Article 3(1) CRC? The instructions 
of Article 3(1) CRC are also directed at ‘courts of law’ and are not limited to 
domestic courts.
8 Conclusion
Compared to other human rights instruments, children’s rights are relative-
ly new. The idea that children’s rights play a role in immigration law is also 
rather new, although the CRC predates all EU immigration law. The Family 
Reunification Directive obliges Member States to take the interests of children 
into account and the obligation of Article 3(1) CRC is codified in Article 24(2) 
Charter. However, this does not automatically mean that the best interests of 
the child are a primary consideration in all family reunification cases. In this 
contribution, the role of the best interests of the child concept in EU family 
reunification law was assessed. It was observed that the Court does not sys-
tematically refer to the best interests of the child concept in all the different 
types of cases that, in one way or another, concern family reunification. This 
is problematic considering the increasingly important role of EU law in family 
reunification law. The EU Member States have obligations both under EU law 
and under the CRC. This means that when Member States are taking measures 
to implement EU law, like taking decisions in family reunification cases, they 
must do so in conformity with both EU law and the CRC. The EU as such is 
not bound by the CRC, but the fact that the CJEU does not systematically refer 
to the best interests of the child does not mean that Member States are not 
obliged to do so. In the area of the family reunification of refugees, there is 
a lack of access to justice, both with regard to the application of the Family 
Reunification Directive as with regard to the enforcement of the Dublin III 
Regulation. The CJEU could offer more guidance to Member States if it system-
atically involved the best interests of the child in all family reunification cases.
